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I'm going to talk to you today about basic trends in trans-
atlantic relationships , but I'm not going to say nruch, if anything, about 
the familiar issues of trade policy, monetary policy, questions of how 
:·~ ....... 
many U. S. troops should be kept in Europe and who should bear the cost of 
those troops, and so on. Those are familiar things to people who are 
engaged in the kind of work you people do and there's no need for me to 
review them for you. Rather, I'm going to try to put them into a nruch 
broader context and try to show you how they are part of the basic proces-
ses of the new period in world history in which we are today and therefore 
what the limits are within which these particular problems are likely to 
be settled. 
I'm going to talk about basic changes at three levels: first, 
those within the national societies of Western Europe and North America; 
second, those in the international system as a whole, that is, the world-
wide system; and, finally, those in Atlantic relationships, a kind of 
intermediate level between the national level and the worldwide level. 
All of these levels interact with one another. Really, the ideal way of 
talking about a subject of this kind would be to give you the whole thing 
simultaneously but unfortunately the human mind doesn't work that way 
and you've got to get it in series, but I hope you'll keep interrelating 
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the different parts. 
Now, each of these levels is an enonnously complex problem and 
in the twenty minutes given I can hardly do more than to try to tick off 
a few of the main characteristics. Certainly if we look at the changes 
that are occurring inside all of the Atlantic countries -- by which I 
mean Western Europe and North .America -- one major set of trends stands 
out very strongly, and this is what I call the proliferation of national 
goals. In all of our countries, if we look back over the past ten years, 
we find that there has been a transformation in the diversity, the size, 
the importance of the goals which our countries are trying to realize both 
internally and externally. Just think of all the different things that our 
country is trying to do today: rebuild the cities, integrate the minorities 
into the mainstream culture, redistribute income more equitably, clear up 
the envi ronrnent, improve the schools , provide better health care, take care 
of the aged, and take care of the need for leisure time activity as the 
workday and the workweek decline. The number of goals that we're trying 
to achieve sirnul taneously has expanded enonnously and the urgency with which 
people feel these goals have got to be achieved now -- not in some distant 
future, but today, or, at worst, tomorrow -- has greatly increased as 
compared with the 1950's, let's say, or even the early 1960's. This means 
that there is competition among goals for resources. It is because all 
of these goals require economic resources, money, if you like, and the real 
goods and services that stand behind money. It's no accident that today 
we have the largest deficit in our peacetime history in the Federal budget 
because of the insistent pressure to realize these national goals. The 
sacrifices that people are prepared to make in order to achieve these goals 
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are less than they were before. You know how nuch Americans resent paying 
higher taxes. The President has to promise that he 1 s not going to increase 
taxes next year, whereas we all know that he 1 s got to increase taxes. Never-
theless, the fact that he feels that he can say this is catering to a 
yearning within .Americans, even if in another mode we know that this isn 1 t 
going to be the case. 
Competition among resources means that the whole process of 
allocating resources among uses in our society has become highly politicized, 
politicized not only in terms of party politics but in terms of the 
dependence upon the decisions of the central government. Everything waits 
upon what Congress does now, whether we have decent health care or decent 
education or social welfare is improved or we have roads and highways, 
our national parks , and so on -- everything depends on Congress , everything 
depends upon the actions of the Executive Branch. People 1 s attention is 
more strongly focused on the agencies of the national government that it 
has ever been before. There is a struggle among competing groups within 
the country -- those that are pushing for one goal as compared with another, 
those that are trying to deny resources to the exploration of space or to 
foreign policy or to development aid in preference for health or education 
or social welfare -- everybody feels these more strongly. Even the nonnal 
economic process whereby resources are allocated through the market process 
has become heavily politicized as the market itself is full of regulation 
by the federal government and regulation by the states, standards which are 
set for automobile emissions, safety -- in almost every field in which we 
look in the economy we find the hand of government, of deliberate decision-
making becoming more and more prominent. 
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This is a basic process that is happening to a greater or lesser 
degree in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Gennany 
-- all over the Atlantic world. One important consequence of it is that 
the tendency to inflation is now endemic in all of our societies. It's 
just not possible in a society of this kind to eliminate inflation. We're 
going to have greater or lesser inflation, not 'no inflation", because the 
minute it abates, the pressure to allocate more resources to this or the 
other thing increases and therefore the demand is always greater than the 
supply of resources. This , I may say parenthetically, is why people who 
say "no growth" are voices crying in the wilderness, however nruch atten-
tion they may get in the press and the media, because the pressure for 
economic growth to increase resources comes as much from the people who are 
condenming the conslDJler society and want to improve the quality of life as 
it comes from those who are trying to increase material consumption and 
have more highways and more schools, and so on. 
Now let us look at the worldwide level. Here again, a basic change 
is now in process, a change from the bipolar system of the Cold War period, 
the postwar period of the 1950's and early 1960's, to a multipolar world, 
really to a pentagonal world, a world in which in the course of the 1970's 
there are going to be five great powers. Whether you call them superpowers 
or not doesn't really matter. There are the two old superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, whose rivalry continues to be a major 
factor in the system but by no means the sole theme of world politics 
which it was in the 1950's, and alongside them you find three other major 
powers gradually emerging: China, Japan, and the European Conmmity (the 
enlarged European Community). 
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Cne of the problems of world politics today is the differential 
rate at which the different aspects of becoming great powers is occurring. 
That is, we might distinguish three aspects: the economic aspect, the 
military aspect, and the political aspect. The United States and the 
Soviet Union are great world powers in all three respects. Our economies 
are gigantic. The Soviet Union doesn't have a great deal of impact on the 
world economy because it has an autarkic state and thus trade is still 
relatively unimportant in it, but it could become increasingly important in 
the future. However, the Soviet Union has a worldwide military capability 
and it has worldwide political prestige or influence which depends upon 
its military capability. The United States has all three. It has been 
tmtil recently the premier superpower. 
Now Cllina. China's economic development lags. China is not a 
major economic factor in the world, but Cllina has an important military 
capability and Cllina desires to play an important role in the world and 
therefore it has political prestige in world affairs which depends partly on 
its own self-image of itself, partly on its military ability, and partly 
on the rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to 
Olina. 
Japan. Japan is a world economic power. There's no question 
about it today. It has the largest economy in the world after the United 
States and the Soviet Union (the largest national economy). It has no 
military capability of any kind and therefore it has very little political 
prestige in the world. Its voice in world political affairs is a very 
minor one. But it seems clear to me, at any rate, that in the course of 
the 1970's Japan is going to be driven, by force of factors that I will 
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mention in a few moments, to develop its own military capability and to 
become once again a great political power as it was in the interwar period. 
Finally, we come to the European Conmtmi ty. The European Commmi-
ty is a major economic power in the world. In fact, it is the largest 
single trading entity in the world. In terms of 1971 trade, if you exclude 
trade among the Ten which is now internal trade and just take their external 
trade, they accounted for 23 per cent of world trade whereas the Uhited 
States and Canada accounted for only 16 per cent of world trade. So the 
European Conmn.mi ty is in a sense already the world's leading economic 
power in terms of the effects of its trade upon the world economy. As a 
military power, it's in a very weak position. Both the French and the 
British have obsolescent regional military nuclear capabilities, not world-
wide capabilities. They are uncoordinated but, again, I think forces working 
i 
I 
to put pressure on the British and French will increase in the course of 
the 70's to coordinate their nuclear capabilities, t~ admit other European 
I 
countries to some role in European military defense, ~and, by the late 70's 
' 
or early 80 's , the Cornnn.mi ty will be a military power in the world and 
I 
therefore it will be a political power in the world J- not equal to the Uhi ted 
I 
States and the Soviet union but influential enough to have world political 
I 
' 
prestige. But the differential rates at which the economic, political, 
I 
and military capabilities are developing constitute major problems today 
in the relationships among states. They generate frustration, resentment. 
These psychological factors in turn, become important constitutents of 
the conflicts, the issues that exist between the united States and Western 
Europe. 
I 
Now let's look at the third level, the intennediate level between 
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the national and the worldwide. If we look back over the period since 
! 
I 
World War II, we can distinguish three periods in U.S. -European relation-
ships. There was firstly the period of the late 40's, the SO's, the 
I 
period even continued into the early 60's, the period of what might be 
called a bilateral relationship between the United States and each West 
European cotmtry individually. All of them related to the United States 
bilaterally, directly, and in that relationship they each -- each one of 
them, even the largest, in the late 40's and early SO's the United King-
dom was the largest -- each of them was confronted with a situation of 
enormous disparity. The .American economy was so nruch bigger than theirs, 
manyfold bigger than the biggest of them. The capabilities of the United 
States were infinitely great compared with their own military or political 
capabilities. .And so it was a bilateral relationship of great disparity. 
I 
But this disparity which in other circtmlStances might have generated a 
great deal of resentment, jealousy, and so on -- it 'did generate some --
: 
was largely repressed because of the need of the European cotmtries for the 
I 
kind of help that the United States could give them and the external 
menace of the Soviet Union which was perceived as being overwhelmingly 
great in the late 40's, early SO's, and through most of the SO's. It is 
important to recognize that what the Europeans needed from the United 
States during this first phase of the postwar relationship was something 
I 
which it was very easy for us to give, something that it was in our interest 
to give. In other words, as the game theorists would say, this was a 
positive stun game. The Europeans gained from it and we gained from it. 
What did they need from us? Chiefly a transfer of resources in the 
economic field: Mlrshall Plan aid, other kinds of aid which we gave them, 
which was very good for us because it enabled them to buy our goods, our 
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exports increased, it created a favorable environment for our investment 
! 
in Europe, and, furthennore, it helped to rebuild the world economy which 
was also in our basic interest to do. Politically, they needed American 
protection, they needed our nuclear energy. Again. in tenns of the kind of 
I 
Gold War relationship which existed in the SO's between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, this was a thing which was in our interests to do, 
to have troops in Europe, to be able to contain, in the language of those 
I 
days, Soviet agression. So, by and large, the kind of problems which 
' 
existed between the United States and Western Europe in the SO's and 
early 60's were problems which could be solved to everyone's nrutual 
advantage. In other words, they expressed conrnon interests, not conflict-
ing interests. 
Now the second period began in the mid-60's and we're just 
about at the end of that period. That's a mixed p~riod, a transition 
period in which, side by side with the bilateral relationship of each 
European co1.mtry to the United States, there has beg1.m to grow up a collec-
tive European relationship with the United States. The two exist side 
by side, and the collective relationship has gradually became stronger 
as the European Community completed its transition to a customs union in 
the late 60's and is now trying slowly to go beyond the customs union 
I 
into a deeper kind of economic integration. As this process has 
I 
I 
happened, the sense of collective European identity vis-a-vis the United 
States has increased. 
Now this second period is still not over. It is hard to predict 
I 
when it will be over, but we can see what is going :to take its place some 
time in the course of the 1970's: that is a relationship in which the 
- 9 -
primary, the essential, the most important aspect of transatlantic 
relationships will be between a European entity, the enlarged Conmmi ty 
and its associates -- those that do not have full membership in it but 
enjoy associate status in the Community -- and the united States on the 
other side of the Atlantic. The individual national relationships will 
be comparatively tmimportant. They will continue to exist so long as 
there are individual nation-states in Western Europe, but the important 
relationship will be the collective one rather than the individual 
national one. 
When will this happen? That is the big question, it seems to 
me, in U.S.-European relations at the present time. Again this differen-
tial rate of change, the slowness with which the European Community is 
going beyond its customs tmion phase. The great questions are two: 
how fast it will go beyond this phase and what will it evolve into? 
Will it evolve into the European federation that has been the dream of 
the European unionists for the last 25 years, or will it evolve into a 
looser kind of confederation, in which national governments still retain 
the essential national powers but in which greater responsibility is 
delegated to the central organs in Brussels. I don't want to go into 
this question which is a highly complex question. I'll give you only 
my conclusion and that is, for a variety of reasons, I believe that it 
is more likely that Europe will evolve into a loose confederation than 
it will evolve into a tight, centralized, supranational federation similar 
to that of our 50 states. 
This in itself creates problems, the slowness with which this 
process is occurring, the fact that it has occurred faster in the economic 
field than in the rnili tary or political field -- all this exacerbates the 
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particular issues that exist between the United States and the Europeans. 
If you take any one of them -- take the nxmetary issue which is so 
important today -- the fact that the Europeans are unable to agree 
among themselves as to what kind of a European monetary arrangement they 
want to have makes it very difficult to refonn the worldwide monetary system 
because of the economic importance of the Cornnuni ty in the world economy. 
Take the political field, the fact that the Europeans have so far been tmable 
to play a bigger role in their own defense -- the British and French have 
been reluctant to coordinate their nuclear deterrent -- means that the 
kind of changes which need to take place in NATO happen too slowly. This 
generates resentment in the United States. Why should we be paying for 
troops in Europe when the Europeans are so weal thy and can afford to pay 
for their own defense. The differential rates of change of these basic 
trends are very, very important in detennining the nature of current 
issues that exist among the cotmtries. 
Furthermore, there is a change in the nature of the issues 
themselves. As I said before, in the postwar period they were largely 
issues which were a positive sum game. Today they are increasingly 
becoming issues which are a zero sum game, that is, you lose and I win, 
or I lose and you win, but we both don't win sinrultaneously as we did 
before. The Europeans no longer require us to transfer resources to 
them as they did in Marshall Plan days. What they require of us are 
things that will involve real sacrifices on our part, and what we require 
of the Europeans involves real sacrifices on their part. Let me give you 
an example. The U.S. balance of payments deficit. This is a cause of 
great concern to the Europeans, and quite rightly so. They have every 
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reason to be worried about it, and they say to us: eliminate your deficit. 
Well, we would like to, but what does that involve? It can be done in 
a very few ways. We could deflate the American economy to the extent that 
our import demand would fall off so substantially and our exports would be 
so low-priced because of the declining demand that we could balance our 
payments that way. But that might mean 12 to 15 million unemployed in 
the .American economy. No .American Administration is ever going to adopt 
a prescription of that kind. So we say to the Europeans: all right, you 
have surpluses in your balance of payments. That's the counterpart of 
our deficit. You eliminate your surpluses. But what does this mean to the 
Europeans? To them, foreign trade -- exports -- are on the average 20 
per cent of the European economy. If they were to cut their exports in 
order to eliminate their surplus in the balance of payments, it could 
mean mssi ve unemployment in Europe too. This is a zero sum game, and 
that's why it is so difficult to settle this issue because it can't be 
settled by acts of generosity, by acts of altruism. It can only be 
settled by one side or the other of the Atlantic making a real sacrifice 
and, for the reasons I gave at the beginning -- that is, the internal 
pressures, the rising expectations of people for everything -- it is 
immensely difficult for national governments to make such sacrifices. Nbw 
I could go through the whole range of economic issues, political issues 
to show you how they are today zero sum games rather than positive sum 
games as they were in the past, but time doesn't permit that. The 
danger is that they will become negative sum games, that is, that we will 
interact with each other in ways where everybody loses, not that one . 
side wins and the other loses, but everybody loses. What do I mean by 
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that? A negative Stml game would be a mercantilist trade war, which is a 
definite possibility, a situation of economic restrictions, retaliations 
by one side against the other, or it could be an international monetary 
crisis in which the entire international monetary system collapsed, or, 
in the political-military field, it could be premature withdrawal of 
American troops from Europe, or something else. So that there is a danger 
today, a real danger, that the zero sum game will deteriorate into a 
negative sum game to everybody's very substantial cost. 
This doesn't open up a very pretty picture, that is, for those 
of us who have been brought up and 1 i ved our 1 i ves to think of U.S. -
European relationships as being essentially relationships of mutual advan-
tage, common interests, where compromise and concession was easy, this 
new situation is a very difficult one to handle and, for the reasons 
that I've explained, the resentments, the jealousies, the frustration.s 
1vhi61 it breeds become very important psychological factors in affect-
ing attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. We say, "those bloody 
Europeans, how ungrateful they are." You read about the talk in Congress 
all the time about how we've been ''Uncle Sucker", .the rest of the world 
has taken us for a ride all these years, and so on. The reaction is 
generated by these fundamental changes. In Europe, yon hear the exact 
counterpart: "TI10se terrible Americans. They don't do ~vhat's necessary 
to have a really rlecent, functioning Horlcl. ~·Jhat 's happened to t.'l-te 
;'\Jnericans? They're no longer tl1e altn1istic leaders of. t.'l-te 1950's and 
nO's." 
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I foresee a period of great difficulty in transatlantic 
relationships, one in which t."1erefore I think that the role of the World 
Affairs r.otmcil is even more important than it \'las in the easier, posb'lar 
period. It is because today you have got to explain to the J\mcrican 
people a JJU.lCh more complex, ambivalent, contradictory world than you did 
in the very simple world of the bipolar confrontation of the U. S. and 
the Soviet Union. You've got to deal with these psychological resentments 
and feelings which arc deeply rooted and which aren't susceptible to being 
reasoned al'lay. You've got to deal lri th situations in ,,.hich real American 
interests are at stake, not just appeal to American altruism. We love 
to think of ourselves as an altruistic nation, but today we no longer 
can act in that mode. TI1ese are verr difficult problems. The task of 
interpreting these cltanges to the American people and making them tlnder-
stand how Ne shculd behave in a situation of this kind so as to avoid 
the "negative sum pCllre" (l,.hich is a real possihili ty today) is a very 
important responsibility ani I'm glad that you people are shouldering it. 
